The London Stock Exchange have published a document entitled “AIM Rules Review”. ShareSoc, including me personally, have criticised the LSE in the past for poor regulation of the AIM market. Many investors view it as a casino because of the numerous problems of fraud, poor disclosures, many delistings or simple bankruptcies in AIM companies. See the ShareSoc campaign page here for more information: https://www.sharesoc.org/campaigns/campaign-improve-aim-market/
As you can see we made a number of recommendations on how to improve the AIM market, and had meetings with AIM management where we put these proposals forward. The LSE regulates the AIM market but their responsibility lies primarily in ensuring the AIM Rulebook is adhered to and that Nomads meet their responsibilities. Other aspects of the market such as market abuse or false accounting are covered by other regulatory bodies, which many private investors do not understand.
So have any of the ShareSoc proposals been covered in the latest document? In summary, yes they have been. Here’s a quick review:
The AIM Rules Review does emphasise the improved recent performance of the AIM market and the fact that the average size of companies listed on it is growing. That has helped to improve the quality of the market.
Vetting new listings. One proposal we made was that new listings should be vetted by an independent panel because many investors considered some of the new listings in the past to be very dubious businesses. They have not taken this up directly but are proposing to formalise the “early notification process”. In addition, they propose to give more guidance to Nomads (whose role it is to perform due diligence on prospective listings) on what they need to take into account. For example, the “good” character of directors or managers, the corporate structure and business model, risky contractual arrangements and “related party” interests. This looks to be one way to tackle past problems, but one suggestion I would make is to add to that list the “regulatory structure and upholding of the rule of law in the countries where the candidate is listed or operates”. For example, it has proved very difficult to pursue fraud in China, and even Greece creates difficulties in that regard.
Free float. One concern they cover is the issue of low free floats which is a concern of some investors. For example, many of the companies that have turned out to be problem ones are those where there is an executive Chairman who holds a majority of the stock (or their close relations or associates do). This gives that person enormous power to prejudice minority shareholders, ignore the views of other board members and ultimately commit major frauds. The LSE’s response on this issue though is simply that the LSE would like to understand the position on new applications and the Nomad’s consideration of it. That surely is open to abuse, but the LSE does ask whether more specific free float rules should be brought in (the LSE document is a public consultation one so you can submit your own comments).
Minimum Fundraising. They also propose the introduction of a minimum fundraising rule and pose some questions on that. This would help to ensure institutional involvement in a company.
Composition of Boards. They mention this, but give no specific suggestions. That is surely an omission when ShareSoc made some specific suggestions in that regard.
Disclosure and Corporate Governance Codes. The document covers the issue that AIM companies can avoid any adherence to a specific corporate governance code. ShareSoc suggested a specific code should be available and applied by all AIM companies. The LSE asks a question on this at least.
Education and Breaches of the AIM Rulebook. The LSE asks how the market, particularly individual investors, can be further educated as to what the LSE can and cannot do. A good question indeed, which I will ponder.
Breaches of the AIM Rules. But one issue we raised with AIM management was the failure to enforce the existing Rules, or penalise and publicise those who break them. Indeed the document spells out how poor this has been by giving some statistics. There were 93 recorded breaches or where “education” was required, but only 16 warning notices or private censures/fines issued on average over the last three years. There were zero public censures apparently. They do ask a question about possibly imposing automatic fines on breaches of the AIM Rules, and invite suggestions for other changes. I will have some, but the basic problem is “self-regulation” and the resulting unwillingness to take tough action. Both firmer rules on penalties and a cultural change is required.
In summary, this Discussion Paper on the AIM Rules is a useful step in the right direction and does appear to tackle some of the issues about AIM that ShareSoc and I raised. It is though only a discussion paper and hence that does not mean necessarily that action will be taken. In some regards it is still quite weak but regrettably AIM management have an uphill battle to get change adopted when many market participants consider everything in the garden is rosy. However, it is surely necessary to improve the reputation of AIM if the market is to attract more listings and reduce the number of complaints from investors.
Roger Lawson (Twitter: @RogerWLawson )