To follow on from my previous comments this morning on Burford Capital (BUR), this is a typical “shorting” attack where the shorter (Muddy Waters) and their supporters make a lot of allegations which investors are unable to verify in any useful time frame. I certainly questioned the accounting approach used by Burford and other litigation finance firms as I commented on it back in June, but disentangling the factual accusations in the Muddy Waters dossier from innuendo and comment is not easy.
It is surely wrong for anyone to make such allegations and publicize them with the objective of making money from shorting the stock without first asking the company concerned to verify that what they are alleging is true – at least as far as the facts they report are concerned rather than just their opinions.
The company may threaten legal action for libel where misleading or inaccurate information is published, but in practice such law suits take so long to conclude, with major practical problems of pursuing those who are resident overseas, while actually worsening the reputational damage rather than improving it, that few companies take that route.
This is an area of financial regulation that does need reform. In the meantime the damage to Burford is probably likely to persist for many months if it ever recovers.
What is the real moral of this story so far as investors are concerned? Simply that trusting the financial accounts of companies when picking investments is a very poor approach. This was reinforced by more news about the accounting problems at Goals Soccer Centres (GOAL) which I also commented on previously. Apparently a report to the board by forensic accountants suggests that the former CEO colluded with the former CFO to create fictitious documents including invoices (see FT report on 3/8/2019). Clearly the audits over some years failed to pick up the problems. In addition it looks like the demise of Carillion is going to be the subject of a legal action against their former auditors (KPMG) by the official receivers. Financial accounts, even of large companies such as Carillion, simply cannot be trusted it seems.
This is not just about poor audits though. The flexibility in IFRS as regards recognition of future revenues is one of the major issues that is the cause of concerns about the accounts of Burford, as it was with Quindell – another case where some investors lost a lot of money because they believed the profit statements.
This seems an opportune moment to mention a new book which is in the process of being published. It’s called “Business Perspective Investing” with a subtitle of “Why Financial Numbers Are Not Important When Picking Shares”. It’s written by me and it argues that financial ratios are not the most important things to look at when selecting shares for investment. Heresy, you may say, but I hope to convince you otherwise. More information on the book is available here: https://www.roliscon.com/business-perspective-investing.html
There are some principles explained in that book that helped me to avoid investing in Burford, in Quindell, in Carillion, in Silverdell and many of the other businesses with dubious accounts or ones that were simple frauds. These are often companies that appear to be very profitable and hence generate high investor enthusiasm among the inexperienced or gullible. It may not be a totally foolproof system but it does mean you can avoid most of the dogs.
With so many public companies available for investment why take risks where the accounts may be suspect or the management untrustworthy? One criticism of Neil Woodford is that his second biggest investment in his Equity Income Fund was in Burford. If you look at his other investments in that and his Patient Capital Trust fund they look to be big bets on risky propositions. He might argue that investment returns are gained by taking on risk which is the conventional mantra of investment professionals. But that is way too simplistic. Risks of some kinds such as dubious accounts are to be avoided. It’s the management of risk that is important and size positioning. The news on Burford is going to make it very difficult for Woodford’s reputation as a fund manager to survive this latest news.
Roger Lawson (Twitter: https://twitter.com/RogerWLawson )
I have read the MW report. It looks pretty compelling. Interesting that Burford is now threatening to countersue. Short tracker says MW are 0.71% short, on 5 Aug, but they may have shorted more since.
Share price was £16.69 on 24 July and £13.81 on 5 Aug. FCA must surely be looking at this to see if the news of the plan leaked?
MW profit so far is £134million! , ie 219million shares in issue x0.71% MW stake x (£13.81-£5.16 last night closing price) = £134 million. not a bad return.
LSE AIM regulator needs to look into why a £5bn company suddenly became a £1.3bn company. Are its rules too loose and too easily manipulated?
MW profit so far was £13.4million! , ie 219million shares in issue x0.71% MW stake x (£13.81-£5.16 last night closing price) = £13.4 million. Still not a bad return.